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THE ENDOGENEITY OF THE OPTIMUM
CURRENCY AREA CR~ERIA
ABSTRACT
A country’s suitability for entry into a currency union depends on a number of economic
conditions. These include, inter alia, the intensity of trade with other potential members of the
currency union, and the extent to which domestic business cycles are correlated with those of the
other countries. But international trade patterns and international business cycle correlations are
endogenous, This paper develops and investigates the relationship between the two phenomena.
Using thirty years of data for twenty industrialized countries, we uncover a strong and striking
empirical finding: countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business
cycles. It follows that countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union












arose @haas .berkeley.eduThe Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria
L Introduction
Countries considering whether to enter the proposed European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) weigh the potential benefits ofjoining the currency union against the inevitable
costs. Joining a currency union brings benefits such as a reduction in the transactions costs
associated with trading goods and services between countries with different moneys. Countries
with close international trade links would potentially benefit greatly from a common currency and
are more likely to be members of an optimumcumency area (OCA). Thus, the nature and etient
of international trade is one criterion for EMU entry, or, more generally, membership in an OCA.
On the other hand, joining EMU brings costs. Cited most frequently is foregoing the
possibility of dampening business cycle fluctuations through independent counter-cyclic monetary
policy.] Countries with idiosyncratic business cycles give up a potentially important stabilizing
tool if they join a currency union, Another criterion for EMU entry is therefore the cross-count~
correlation of business cycles. Countries with “symmetric” cycles are more likely to be members
of an OCA. Succinctly, countries with tight international trade ties and positively correlated
business cycles are more likely to join, and gain from EMU, ceterisparibus.
These topics have already been closely studied by economists. Estimates of the
transactions costs that might be saved by EMU have been summarized by the Commission of the
European Communities (1990). A number of economists, including Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993A 1993b, 1994, 1996), have analyzed the business cycles and shocks affecting different
potential EMU members, so as to be able to quantifi the potential importance of national
1 The wst of losingmonetary independence may be low if laboris mobileamong the members of the currenq
uniom or if an effective international or intertemporal system of fid transfers exists. We do not focus explicitly
on these issues in this paper, although the European Commission (1990) provides extensive references.
1monetary policy, Our aim in this paper is to link the two issues so as to make a simple point. We
argue that a ntive examination of historical data gives a misleading picture of a country’s
suitability for entry into a currency unioq since both criteria are endogenous.z
Entry into a currency union may significantly raise international trade linkages (and
therefore the benefits foregone by not joining a currency union). More importantly, tighter
international trade ties may significantly affect the nature of national business cycles. Countries
that enter a currency union are likely to experience dramatically different business cycles than
before. In part this will necessarily reflect changes in monetary policy; but in it will also be a
result of closer international trade with the other members of the union. From a theoretical
viewpoint, closer international trade could result in either tighter or looser correlations of national
business cycles. Cycles could, in principle, become more idiosyncratic. Closer trade ties could
result in countries becoming more specialized in the goods in which they have comparative
advantage, as noted by e.g., Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969), and Krugman (1993). The
countries might then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, resulting in more idiosyncratic
business cycles. However, if demand shocks predominate, or there are important shocks which
are common across countries – or intra-industty trade accounts for most trade – then business
cycles may become more similar across countries when countries trade more. We believe the
latter case to be the more realistic one, but consider the question to be open.
We test our view empirically, using a panel of bilateral trade and business cycle data
spanning twenty industrialized countries over thirty years. The empirical results are strong and
clear-cut. They indicate that closer international trade links result in more closely correlated
business cycles across countries. This finding is interesting since a number of economists have
2 The European Gmmission (1990) has already recognized both of these phenomem For instanm, on pl 1 they
state ”.. .Elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and transactions costs ... are sure to yield gains in efficiency ...
2claimed the opposite.
Our findings lead to a number of conclusions on the prospects and desirability of EMU.
Continued European trade liberalization can be expected to result in more tightly correlated
European business cycles, making a common European currency both more likely and more
desirable. Indeed, monetary union itself may lead to a firther boost to trade integration and hence
business cycle symmetry. Countries which join EMU, no matter what their motivation, may
satis~ OCA criteria ex post even if they do not ex ante!
In part 11of the paper, we provide a theoretical framework for our analysis, drawing
heavily on the large literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCAS). We next discuss the
literature briefly, and present our empirical methodology and data set. Section V contains our
actual empirical results, and section VI has a brief conclusion.
IL Theoretical Framework
Since Mundell (1961) first developed the concept of an optimum currency are% a vast
literature has developed in the area. This literature includes classic contributions by McKinnon
(1963) and Kenen (1969). Recent surveys are available in Tavlas (1992) and Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1996). Much of this literature focuses on four inter-relationships between the
members of a potential OCA. They are: 1) the extent of trade; 2) the similarity of the shocks and
cycles; 3) the degree of labor mobility; and 4) the system of fiscal transfers (if any). The greater
the linkages between the countries using any of the four criteria, the more suitable a common
currency,
EMU will rtiuce the incidence of country-specific shocks.”
3Given the theoretical consensus in the area, it is natural that the OCA criteria have been
applied extensively. For instance, when most researchers judge the suitability of different
European countries for EMU, they examine the four criteria (or some subset) using European
da~ frequently using the United States as a benchmark for comparison.
Such a procedure maybe untenable, since the OCA criteria arejointly endogenous. For
instance, the suitability of European countries for EMU cannot be judged on the basis of historical
data since the structure of these economies is likely to change in the event of EMU. As such, this
paper is simply an application of the well-known “Lucas Critique”. Without denying the
importance of the third and fourth criteria, we focus on the first two OCA criteria.
ILa The OCA Paradigm
Countries that are highly integrated with each other, with respect to international trade in
goods and services, are more likely to constitute an optimum currency area. Openness is one
criterion for membership in an OCA since greater trade leads to greater savings in the transactions
costs and risks associated with different currencies, as already noted. Further, the high marginal
propensity to import associated with an open economy reduces output variability and the need for
domestic monetary policy, since openness acts as an automatic stabilizer.
Of course, openness is not the ordy criterion for membership in a common currency area.
Ever since Mundell (1961) it has been appreciated that the more highly correlated the business
cycles are across member countries, the more appropriate a common currency. Ordy countries
whose business cycles are imperfectly synchronized with others’ could benefit from the potential
stabilization tiorded by a national monetary policy.’
3 We take it for granted hat monetary policy cannot permanently tiwt eithera country’s real income level or
groti rate; henee our focus on business cycles.
4In Figure 1 we graph conceptually the extent of trade among members of a potential
common currency area, against the correlation of their incomes. The OCA line is downward-
sloping: the advantages of adopting a common currency depend positively on both trade
integration and the degree to which business cycles are correlated internationally. Points high up
and to the right represent groupings of countries that should share a common currency; the
benefits outweigh the costs of lost monetary independence. Points down and to the Iefi represent
countries that should float individually, since monetary sovereignty outweighs the transactions
cost savings of a common currency.
Can the degree of integration between potential members of a common currency area be
considered independently of income correlation? Surely not, since the correlation of business
cycles across countries depends on trade inte~ation. Though it is ofien treated as a parameter,
integration changes over time. European countries trade with each other more than in the past,
and this trend may continue. It is driven in part by regional trade policy: such initiatives as the
completion of the single market in 1992 and the expansion of the EU to 15,members. ~U itse~
maypromote intra-European trade, If the effects of the exchange rate risk and transactions costs
are important,~ EMUproponents claim. Thus cyclic correlation is endogenous with respect to
trade integratio~ while integration is also affected by policy.
Our hypothesis is that this relationship is positive: the more one country trades with
others, the more highly correlated will be their business cycles. This is certainly the relationship
pictured by the Commission of the European Communities (1990). But it is not universally
accepted. Authors such as Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969), and Krugman (1993) have pointed
out that as trade becomes more highly integrated, countries specialize more in production, They
seem to expect that increased degree of specialization will reduce the international correlation of
5incomes, given sufficiently large supply shocks.
11.b Further Analysis
Ideally, we would use a genera! equilibrium model of international trade to derive testable
hypotheses. Such a model would have to involve barriers to trade (either “natural,” such as
transportation costs, or “created” such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers), since our objective is to
gauge the impact of reduced trade barriers on the international co-movements of business cycles.
Because of the latter point, this model, unlike many models of international trade, would have to
be stochastic with roles for both industry-specific and aggregate shocks. Further, it would have
to involve both inter-sectoral trade (so as to be able to accommodate specialization) and intra-
industry trade (since the effects on the latter of opening trade are thought to be large and different
from those on inter-industry trade).’
Creating such a model from scratch is beyond the limited scope of this (chiefly empirical)
paper. Our objective here is much more modest. We seek in this section merely to provide some
intuition for the interplay between trade intensity and business cycles. We begin by expressing
output as:
where: Ayt represents the growth rate of real output for the domestic country at time t; UL1 is the
sector-specific deviation of the growth rate of output in sector i at time t from the country’s
4 Ricci (1996) provides a theoretical analysis which contains many of these elements. His analysis focuses on the
relationship betw=n the exchange rate regime and firm location (with cortsequenas for the extent of international
trade). Using a static model which incorpomtes both inter-industry and intra-industry trade, he finds thatflexibfe
6average growth rate at time t, Vt;a i is the weight of sector i in total output (Xi~i= 1); and g is the
trend rate of output growth for the country. The analog for the foreign country is:
Ay*t = Xia ,U,,t *. +v*L+g*
where an asterisk denotes a foreign value, and we assume that the sector-specific shocks (but not
necessarily the sector-specific output shares) are common across countries. Stockman (1988)
provides one simple way to derive and use univanate output models like this in a standard
neoclassical setting.
We assume that the {uiL}are distributed independently across both sector and time of each
other, with sectoral variance ~2i. We firther assume that the {v~}are distributed independently
over time, independently of the sector-specific shocks. For simplicity, we also abstract from trend
effects in the analysis which follows, though we return to the issue below.
The cross-country covariance of output is:
COV(Ayt, Ay*t) = cov(~iaiui,t, Eia*iui,t) + COV(VI, V*~)
= Zi~,a*i02i + ~v,@
where oV,+is the covariance between the country-specific aggregate shocks,
exchange mtes induce pialization compared with fixed rates, sin~ they automatically dampen the effects of
industry-specific (and other) shocks.
7In our empirical analysis, we work with correlation coefficient estimates, that is the
covariance adjusted for the country-specific volatility of aggregate income. The degree to which
business cycles are correlated internationally rises or falls depends on how this covariance changes
with increased integrations Increased integration may affect both terms; we consider them
sequentially.
& noted by Eichengreen and Krugman, increased trade results in greater specialization if
most trade is inter-industry. As countries tend to produce and export goods in which they have a
comparative advantage, a negative cross-indust~ correlation between Ui and u*i tends to
develop; the covariance falls accordingly. If much trade is wilhinrather than between industries,
such specialization effects may be small. The latter sort of trade -- intra-industry – has attracted
much attention of late and is commordy considered to account for a major share of international
trade.
The covanance of the country-specific aggregate shocks may also be tiected by increased
integration. There are a number of potentially important channels. The spill-over of aggregate
demand shocks will tend to raise the covanance, since e.g., an increase in public or private
spending in one country tends to raise demand for both foreign and domestic output. This may
not be the ordy channel. The presence of greater trade integration may also induce a more rapid
spread of productivity shocks, raising the covariance (e.g., Coe and Helpman). Further,
government-induced policy shocks may become more coordinated in the presence of increased
integration.
It seems to us that closer international integration will tend to raise the covariance of
country-specific demand shocks and aggregate productivity shocks. This tends to increase the
5 Our data set SIIOWS no relationship between openness and activity volatility.
8international coherence of business cycles. On the other hand, integration tends to raise the
degree of industrial specialization, leading to more asynchronous business cycles. The importance
of this effect depends on the degree of specialization induced by integratio~ which may not be
large if most trade is intra-industry rather than inter-industry. And the net effect on business cycle
coherence depends on the relative variances of aggregate and industry-specific shocks. If the
former are larger than the latter (as in e.g., Stockman (1988)), then we would expect closer trade
integration to result in more synchronized business cycles.
Casual empiricism leads us to the view that integration results in more highly correlated
national business cycles. However, the alternative view is defensible on theoretical grounds. The
matter can only be resolved empirically. We now turn to that task.
IIL Related Results from the Literature
A number of papers have examine the international correlation structure of business
cycles. We review the relevant papers briefly.
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) examined the correlation of output growth rates for Germany
and France; Weber (1991) did so for other members of the European Community. Stockman
(1988) decomposes cross-countries growth rates of industrial production for European countries
into industry-specific and country-specific components. Bayoumi andEichengreen(1993~b,c,
1994) argue that these studies coflate information on the incidence of disturbances and on
economies’ responses. Accordingly, Bayoumi and Eichengreen use structural vector auto-
regressions to distinguish underlying aggregate demand and aggregate supply disturbances from
the subsequent dynamic response. They use the results to find plausible groupings of countries
for monetary union. We see little justificatio~ however, for the assumption that supply
9disturbances are the only ones to which independent monetary policy may wish to respond.
De Grauweand Vanhaverbeke (1993) find that’’asymmetric” or idiosyncratic shocks tend
to be more prevalent at the level of regions within a country than at the level of nations within
Europe. This seems to support the view that increasing integration, may resu!t in more
idiosyncratic activity. However, De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke use the stanhrd deviation of the
d~ference in percentage changes in income between the two regions instead of the correlation of
percentage changes in income between two regions,. This may be a less usefil measure of income
links. There is every reason to think that the variance of income at the regional level is much
higher than the variance of income at the national level. Since national income is the sum of
regional income, some local variation is bound to wash out despite the presence of potentially
high inter-regional correlations.G
Close in spirit to our view is a recent paper by Artis and Zhang (1995), which finds that
most European countries’ incomes were more highly correlated with the U.S. during 1961-79, but
(with the exception of the UK) have become more highly correlated with Germany since joining
the ERM.7
All this work is subject to the Lucas Critique discussed above. Perhaps more importantly,
no existing work to the best of our knowledge, attempts to endogenize international business
cycle correlations.
Iv. Empirical Methodology
GIf regional varianws are larger than national vtiances, simple algebm can show that the variance of regional
differences can appear larger than the variance of nationat differences, even though regional inames are in fact
more highly correlated than nationat variances.
7 Of ~urse this maybe the retit of the loss of monetary independence, rather than of increased trade.
10In this section, we present some empirical evidence on the relationship between bilateral
income correlations and bilateral trade intensity. The evidence is consistent with a strong positive
effect of trade intensity on income correlations,
IV.a Measuring Bilateral Trade Intensity and Business Cycle Correlations
Our empirical analysis relies on measures of two key variables: bilateral trade intensity;
and bilateral comelations of real economic activity. We discuss these in tum.s
We are interested in the bilateral intensity of international trade between two countries, i
and j at a point in time t. We use three different proxies for bilateral trade intensity. The first uses
export data exclusively; the second uses only imports, and the final (and prefemed) measure uses
both exports and imports:
WX~~ = Xij,/(Xi,t + Xj,~)
wmtil = M~t/(Mi.t+ Mj.t)
titit = (Xijt+ Mtit)/(Xi.t+ Xj.t+ Mi.t+ Mj.t)
where: Xotdenotes total nominal exports from country i to country j during period t; Xi.t denotes
total global exports from country i; and M denotes imports. (In practice we take natural
logarithms of all three ratios.) We think of higher values of e,g., wtij~as indicating greater trade
intensity between countties i and j.
The bilateral trade data are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of
Tradedata set. The data are amual and cover twenty-one industrial countries from 1959 through
* The STATA 4,0 data set and pro- are availablefor one year upon aipt oftwo fomtted 3.5” diskettes and a slf-
~ stamped mailer.
111993.’
There are a variety of problems associated with bilateral trade data (e.g., Xijt z Mjit). Our
data measure actual trade intensity, which may understate the potential importance of trade.
Further, from a theoretical point of view, it is unclear which set of weights is optimal; some
countries may have specialized exports or imports, Thus we conduct our tests with all three
measures of trade intensity. Reassuringly, our answers appear to be insensitive to the exact way
that we measure trade intensity. This is unsurprising, as the three different measures are highly
positively inter-comelated. Figure 2 provides scatter-plots of each measure of trade intensity
graphed against the others; non-parametric data smoothers are also provided to “connect the
dots”.
Our other important variable is the bilateral correlation between real activity in country i
and country j at time t. Again, it is difficult to figure out the optimal single empirical analog to the
theoretical concept. We therefore use a variety of different proxies.
We use four different measures of real economic activity: the first pair taken fi-om the
International Monetary Fund’s InternationalFinancial Statistics;the other two from the OECD’S
Main Economic Indicators. In particular, we use: real GDP (typically IFS line 99); an index of
industrial production (line 66); total employment (OECD mnemonic “et”); and the unemployment
rate (“uti’). All the data are quarterly, covering (with gaps) the same sample of countries and
years as the trade data.
We transfom our variables in two different ways. First, we take natural logarithms of
each variable except the unemployment rate. Second, we de-trend the variables so as to focus on
business cycle fluctuations. Given the importance of different de-trending procedures, and the
9 The countries are: Australia; AustriT Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland;
Idy; Japan; Norway; Netilerlands; New Zealand; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; the UK; and the US. In
12lack of consensus about optimal de-trending techniques, we employ four different de-trending
methodologies,
First, we take simple fourth-differences of the (logs of the) variables (i.e., we subtract the
fourth lag of e.g., real GDP from the current value), multiplying by 100 (so that the resulting
variable can be interpreted as a growth rate). Second, we de-trend the variables by examining the
residual from a regression of the variable on a linear time trend, a quadratic time trend, and three
quarterly dummies. Third, we de-trend the variables using the well-known Hodrick-Prescott
(“HP”) filter (using the traditional smoothing parameter of 1600). Finally, we apply the HP filter
to the residual of a regression of the variable on a constant and quarterly dummies.
We have also constructed a fifih transformation of our dependent variable. This is similar
to our second variant in that we de-trend the variables by examining the residual fi-om a regression
of the variable on a set of controls, But we add a control which is meant to account for the
dependency of the economy to imported oil price shocks. In particular, we take the real price of
oil (the price of oil in dollars per barrel, divided by the CPI for industrial countries), and multiply
it by net exports of&e], expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP. This variable, meant to
measure the degree of dependency on imported oil, is then added to our other antrol variables
including linear and quadratic time trends, and quarterly dummies.
Mer appropriately transforming our variables, we are able to compute bilateral
correlations for real activity, These correlations are estimated (for a given concept of real
economic activity), behveen two countries over a given span of time. Thus, for instance, we
estimate the correlation between real GDP de-trended with the HP filter for two countries i and j
over the first part of our sample period. We begin by splitting our sample into four equally-size
parts: the beginning of the sample through 1967Q3; 1967Q4 through 1976Q2; 1976Q3 through
future work we hope to include developing countries. We thti Tam Bayoumi for providing these data.
131985Q1; and 1985Q2 through the end of the sample. Since we have twenty-one countries, we are
thus lefi with a sample size of 840 observations; 210 bilateral country-pair correlations
[%21x.20)/2], with four observations (over different time periods) per country-pair.
While our three measures of trade intensity are similar to one another, the same is not true
of our sixteen measures of business cycle correlations. Both the measure of economic activity
(GDP/industnal production etc.) and the de-trending technique matter (though all sixteen
measures of bilateral activity correlation are positively correlated with each other), Figure 3
graphs different of business cycle correlations against each other, holding the de-trending method
constant (at fourth-differencing) but allowing the underlying activity measure to vary. Figure 4 is
an analog which vanes the de-trending technique but only portrays real GDP. Since the
international business cycle correlations are so impetiectly related to one another, we check the
sensitivity of our results extensively.
IV.b Econometric Methodology
The regressions we estimate take the form:
Corr(v,s)ij,l = a + ~Trade(w) iJ,~+ GiJ,r.
Corr(v,s)ti,r denotes the correlation between couniry i and count~j over time span r for activity
concept v (corresponding to: real GDP (denoted “y”); industrial production (i); employment (e);
or the unemployment rate (u)), de-trended withmethods (corresponding to: fourth-differencing
(d); quadratic de-trending (t); HP-filtering (h); HP-filtering on the SA residual (s); or quadratic
de-trending with the oil control (o)). Trade(w) iJ,l denotes the natural logarithm of the average
14bilateral trade intensity between country i and country j over time span ~ using trade intensi~
concept w (corresponding to: export weights (x); import weights (m); or total trade weights (t)).
Finally, s ~,. represents the myriad influences on bilateral real activity correlations above and
beyond the influences of international trade, and a and ~ are the regression coefficients to be
estimated.
We have sixteen versions of the regressand (as we consider four activity concepts and four
de-trending methods) and three versions of the regressor (since we have three sets of trade
weights). We estimate all 48 versions of our regression to check results for robustness,
The object of interest to us is the slope coefficient ~. We are interested in both the sign
and the size of the coefficient. The sign of the slope tells us whether the Eichengreen-Krugman
specialization effect dominates (in which case we would expect a negative ~, since more intense
trading relations would be expect to lead to more idiosyncratic business cycles and hence a lower
wrrelations of economic activity) or the expected traditional effect prevails (in which case ~
would be expected to be positive). The size of the coefficient allows us to quanti~ the economic
importance of this effect.
A simple OLS regression of bilateral activity income correlations on trade intensity maybe
inappropriate. Countries are likely deliberately to link their currencies to those of some of their
most important trading partners, in order to capture gains associated with greater exchange rate
stability. In doing so, they lose the ability to set monetary policy independently of those
neighbors, The fact that their monetary policy will be closely tied to that of their neighbors could
result in an obsewed positive association between trade links and income links. In other words,
the association could be the rewlt of countries’ application of the OCA criterion, rather than an
aspect of economic structure that is invariant to exchange rate regimes.
15To identi~ the effect of bilateral trade patterns on income correlations in such
circumstances, we need exogenous determinants of bilateral trade patterns. Such determinants
muld be used as instrumental variables to produce consistent estimates of ~, Our prefemed set of
instrumental variables includes the most basic variables of the well-known “gravity” model of
bilateral trade: distance between the pair of countries in question, and dummy variables for
common border or language. (We examine our “first-stage” instrument equations explicitly
below.)”
Parenthetically, estimation of the standard error for ~ is potentially complicated. Our
observations may not be independent; the e.g., French-Belgian observation for the first quarter of
the sample may depend on either the French-Belgian observation for the second quarter, or the
French-Dutch observation for the first quarter (or both). We ignore such potential dependencies
in computing our covariance matrices, and instead try simply not to take their precise size too
seriously. It turns out there is no need to do so, but this is a possible extension for future
research.l 1
v. Empirical Resu!ts
We begin our analysis with simple ordinary least squares, Consistent with our priors,
estimation with instrumental variables turns out to deliver the same message even more strongly.
V.a OLS Work
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of ~ are tabulated in Table 1. The estimates, along
with their standard errors, are presented in three columns, corresponding to the three different
10LnstrumenM variable estimation is also appropriate since the regressors are measured with error.
]1 The data set revds few signs of such dependenq. White covariance matrices are very similar to traditional
ones; non-parametric tests for dependencies across periods reveal no trends; boot-strapping our standard errors
results in very similar standard error estimates. Parenthetically, our IV standard errors should be consistent in the
16measures of bilateral trade intensity. For each measure, sixteen estimates (four measures of
economic activity each de-trended in four different ways) are presented in the rows.
The estimates indicate that a closer trade linkage between two countries is strongly and
consistently associated with more tightly correlated economic activity between the two countries.
The size of this effect depends on the exact measure of emnomic activity (as is expected), but
does not depend ve~ sensitively on the exact method of de-trending the data or the measure of
bilateral trade intensity. Parenthetically, the adjustment for the oil price reduces the size of the
coefficients slightly, although they remain positive and significant.
We have checked these results in a number of different ways, and they seem to be robust.
For instance, a consistently positive estimate of ~ appears whether or not the trade intensity
measure is transformed by natural logarithms, and whether or not the observations are weighted
by country size. More importantly, the results do not appear to be very sensitive to the exact
sample chosen. The data from the last quarter of the sample show more evidence of a strongly
positive estimate of ~ than does that from the first quarter, but the exact choice of countries does
not matter. We have also tested for the importance of important non-linearities in the relationship
between trade intensity and activity correlations by estimating the equation with a non-parametric
data smoother (similar to locally weighted regression but without neighborhood weighting); the
non-linear effects are typically statistically insignificant and the strong positive effect of trade
intensity on business cycle correlations is not affected. Adding either time-specific or country-
specific “fixed effect” controls (or both) also does not affect the sign or statistical significance of
~. Finally, we have split our data set into two sub-periods across time (instead of four), and re-
estimated our equations. The resulting point-estimates of ~ remain quite similar to those recorded
in Table 1.
presenm of generated regressors. 17The issue of simultaneous causation is potentially serious, since integration is itself
endogenous. For this reason, we take instrumental variable (IV) estimates of ~ more seriously
than our OLS estimates. We use three instrumental variables: the natural logarithm of the
distance between the business centers of the relevant pair of countries; a dummy variable for
geographic adjacency; and a dummy variable which indicates if the pair of countries share a
common language. Each of these variables is expected to be correlated with bilateral trade
intensity, but can reasonably be expected to be unaffected by other conditions which affect the
bilateral correlation of economic activity.
Direct evidence on the “first-stage” linear projections of (the natural logarithm o~ bilateral
period-average trade intensity on our three favored instrumental variables is presented in Table 2.
Distance (more precisely, the natural log thereof) is strongly negatively associated with trade
intensity, as predicted by standard “gravity” models of international trade. Countries that share
either a common border or a common language also have significantly more trade than others.
The fist-stage equations appear to fit relatively well,
Also included in Table 2 is a minor perturbation to our standard first-stage equatio~
namely the “default equation”, augmented by a variable registering membership in a regional trade
agreement, There are two relevant agreements: 1) the US/Canada FT& and its successor,
NAFT& and 2) the EEC/EC.’2 Membership in a regional trading agreement is strongly
associated with more intense international trade in both an economic and statistical sense. Entry
into a regional trade agreement appears to raise bilateral trade intensity by almost 50°/0 (although
firther effects may also appear later on). ~lle the variable appears to be approximately
orthogonal to our three default instrumental variables, we do not use it as one of our default
12 Wecompute this variable by taking a pair-specfic indicator variable (e.g., unity for UK/France in 1975, zero for
tie US/Japan in 1975) and estimating sub-period averages over time (e.g., the sub-period for the last quarter of the
18instrumental variables since it is potentially associated with tighter income correlations directly
(e.g., through exchange rate arrangements; there is a high correlation between EC and EMS
membership), Happily, our ~ estimates are insensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the extra
instrumental variable.
V.b Instrumental Variable Estimation
Instrumental variable estimates of j3(estimated with our three default instrumental
variables) are tabulated in Table 3, which is a direct analog to Table 1. As expected, the results
are consistent with the OLS results of Table 1, but they are somewhat stronger in both economic
and statistical significance, The effect of greater intensity of international trade on the correlation
of economic activity remains strongly positive and statistically significant, but is larger than the
simple OLS estimates indicate (though we try not to interpret the t-statistics too literally, given
the potential problems of cross-sectional or inter-temporal dependency). The oil-adjusted results
are now slightly large than the other coefficients.
As with the OLS results, our IV estimates of ~ are robust to a wide range of perturbations
to our basic econometric methodology. We have performed all the experiments mentioned in
conjunction with Table 1 without disturbing our central results. We have also changed the list of
instrumental variables in a number of different ways without changing our results. For instance,
adding dummy variables for membership in GATT or regional trade arrangements as extra
instrumental variables does not change our results, as does adding country population and output.
V.c More Sensitivity Analysis
-pie is non-zero for all EC-SpanislI observations but the observations are not uni~ since Spain was not in the
EC for the entire sub-s~mple; earlier Spanish observations are all zero).
19We have augmented our relationship by adding a dummy variable that is unity if the two
countries shared a bilateral fixed exchange rate throughout the sample. This is an important test.
The Bayoumi-Eichengreen view is that the high correlation among European incomes is a result
not of trade links, but of Europeans’ decision to relinquish monetary independence vis-a-vis their
neighbors. If this is correct, putting the exchange regime variable explicitly on the right-hand side
should show the effect, and the apparent effect of the trade and geography variables should
disappear. Instead, the addition of this exchange rate variable does not significantly alter ~. The
actual estimates are provided in Table 4, which is an analog of Table 3 (with the same
instrumental variables) when the equation is augmented by an indicator variable which is unity if
the pair of countries maintained a mutually fixed exchange rate during the relevant sample period.
For simplicity, only the results with total trade weights are reported. The positive ~ coefficient
still appears quite strong; indeed its sign and magnitude is essentially unchanged from Table 3. By
way of contrast, the effect of a fixed exchange rate regime per se is not well determined. The
coefficients vary in sign and magnitude depending on the exact measure of economic activity and
de-trending method used to compute the bilateral activity correlation, 13
Global oil price shocks are thought to be a major source of positively correlated business
cycles, regardless of the exchange rate regime. We have petiormed a direct check for the
importance of oil price shocks by augmenting our relationship with a variable meant to measure
the degree of dependency on imported oil. The oil shock variable (the same used to adjust the oil-
adjusted regressands tabulated in Tables 1 and 3) is the product of two variables: the real price of
oil (the price of oil in dollars per barrel, divided by the CPI for industrial countries), and net
exports of fiel, expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP. We add the oil shock variable to our
13Results are not changed substantively if the actual bilateral exchange rate volatility is substituted for our
indicator variable.
20default regression and estimate the coefficients with instrumental variables. The results are
presented in Table 5. There are two sets of columns. The second is a minor perturbatio~ in that
the extra regressor is the percentage change of the real oil price multiplied by next exports of
fiel. AgaiL as in Table 4, the same instrumental variables as in Table 3 are used, and for
simplicity, only the results with total trade weights are reported.
The positive ~ coeticient still appears quite strong; indeed its sign and magnitude is
essentially unchanged horn Tables 3 and 4. By way of contrast, the effect of oil price dependency
is not firmly established. The coefficients vary in sign and magnitude when the level of the oil
price is used, When the percentage change of the oil price is used, the oil price regressor has a
consistently positive (though not always significant) coefficient. But the durable sign and
significance of ~ is unaffected.
VL A Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the relationship between two of the criteria used to
determine whether a country is a member of an optimum currency area. From a theoretical
viewpoint, the effect of increased trade integration on the cross-country correlation of business
cycle activity is ambiguous. Reduced trade barriers can result in increased industrial specialization
by country and therefore more asynchronous business cycles resulting from industry-specific
shocks. On the other hand, increased integration may result in more highly correlated business
cycles because of demand shocks or intra-industry trade.
This ambiguity is theoretical rather than empirical, Using a panel of thirty years of data
from twenty industrialized countries, we find a strong positive relationship between the degree of
bilateral trade intensity and the cross-country bilateral correlation of business cycle activity. That
21is, greater integration historically has resulted in more highly synchronized cycles.
The endogenous nature of the relationship between various OCA criteria is a
straightforward application of the celebrated Lucas Critique. Still, it has considerable relevance
for the current debate on Economic and Moneta~ Union in Europe. For instance, some countries
may appear, on the basis of historical data, to be poor candidates for EMU entry. But EMU entry
per se, for whatever reason, may provide a substantial impetus for trade expansion; this in turn
may result in more highly correlated business cycles. That is, a country is more likely to satisfi






















Table 1: OLS Estimates of B
(Effect of Trade Intensity on Income Correlation)
De-Trending Total Trade Weights Import Weights Export Weights
Differencing 7.1 (.88) 6.2 (.79) 6.7 (.85)
Differencing 6.9 (.95) 5.5 (,83) 6.9 (.95)
Differencing 5.7 (1.1) 4.8 (1.0) 5.3 (1.1)
Differencing 3.3 (.97) 2.5 (.87) 3.1 (.95)
Quadratic 7.2 (1.1) 6.3 (,99) 6.4 (1.1)
Quadratic 8.3 (1.2) 7.2 (1.0) 7.6 (1.2)
Quadratic 6.2 (1.4) 6.1 (1.3) 4.8 (1.5)
Quadratic 7.0 (1.4) 6.1 (1.3) 6.4 (1.5)
HP-filter 5.7 (.92) 4.2 (.85) 5.9 (.88)
HP-filter 5.6 (1.0) 4.5 (.88) 5.5 (1.0)
HP-filter 6.6 (1.1) 5.7 (.99) 6.2 (1.0)
HP-filter 3.4(1.1) 2.6 (.95) 3.2 (1.0)
HP-SA 4.8 (.84) 3.9 (.78) 4.7 (.81)
HP-SA 4.9 (.94) 3.9 (.81) 4.8 (.94)
HP-SA 6.5 (1.0) 5.7 (.92) 5.9 (.94)
HP-SA 3.2 (1.0) 2.4 (.94) 5.9 (.98)
Oil Adjusted 4.7 (1.2) 3.8 (1.1) 4.7 (1.2)
Oil Adjusted 6.3 (1.3) 5.3 (1.1) 5.9 (1.3)
Oil Adjusted 7.9 (1.5) 6.5 (1.4) 7.6 (1.4)
Oil Adjusted 4.7 (1.5) 4.3 (1.3) 4.1 (1.4)
OLS estimate of ~ (mdtiplied by 100) from
Huber-White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. Intercepts not reported.
Bilateral quarterly data from 21 industrialized countries, 1959 through 1993 split into four sub-periods.
Maximum sample size = 840.
23Table 2: First-StaFe Estimates
(Determinants of Bilateral Trade)
Total Total Import Import Export Export
Trade Trade Weights Weights Weights Weights
Weights Weights
Log of -.45 -.40 -.52 -.48 -.43 -.37
Distance (.03) (,03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Adjacency 1.03 1.01 .83 .81 1.21 1.19
Dummy (.14) (.14) (,14) (.14) (. 16) (.16)
Common .51 .51 .58 .58 .48 .48
Language (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.13) (.13)
Regional .44 .35 .54
Trade (,11) (.12) (.13)
Member
N 840 840 839 839 840 840
RMSE ,98 .97 1.01 1.01 1,14 1.13
RL .39 .40 .40 .40 ,33 .34
OLS estimates from
Trade(w) ij,z = @ + qlbg(l)istance) ij + T2Adjacent ij + q3Language ij + @Re@onal ij,~ + v ij,~.
Standard errors in parentheses. Intercepts not reported.
Bilated quarterly data from 21 industrialized countries, 1959 through 1993 split into four sub-periods.
Maximum sample size = 840.
24Table 3: lV Estimates of ~
(Effect of Trade Intensity on Income Correlation)
Activity De-Trending Total Trade Weights Import Weights Export Weights
GDP Differencing 10.3 (1.5) 10.2 (1.4) 9.7 (1.4)
Ind Prod Differencing 10.1 (1.5) 9.8 (1.5) 9.8 (1.5)
Employ Differencing 8.6 (1.8) 8.4 (1.8) 8.2 (1.8)
Unemp Differencing 7.8 (1.6) 7.6 (1.6) 7.5 (1.6)
GDP Quadratic 11.3 (1.9) 11.1 (1.9) 10.7 (1.8)
Ind Prod Quadratic 9.3 (2.1) 9,0 (2.0) 9.0 (2.0)
Employ Quadratic 8.6 (2.5) 8.6 (2.4) 7.9 (2.4)
Unemp Quadratic 10.8 (2.4) 10.5 (2.4) 10.6 (2.3)
GDP HP-filter 8.6(1.5) 8.4 (1.5) 8.2 (1.4)
Ind Prod HP-filter 9.8 (1.7) 9.4 (1,6) 9.4 (1.6)
Employ HP-filter 10.1 (1.8) 9.8 (1.8) 9.7 (1.8)
Unemp HP-filter 7.8 (1.7) 7.5 (1.7) 7.6 (1.6)
GDP HP-SA 7.3 (1.5) 7.2 (1.4) 6.9 (1.4)
Ind Prod HP-SA 9.1 (1.5) 8.7 (1.5) 8.8 (1.5)
Employ HP-SA 8.6 (1.7) 8.4 (1.7) 8.2 (1.7)
Unemp HP-SA 8.1 (1.7) 7.8 (1.7) 7.8 (1.6)
GDP Oil Adjusted 14.3 (2.0) 13.9 (2.0) 13.8 (1.9)
Ind Prod Oil Adjusted 14.0 (2.2) 13.5 (2.1) 13.6 (2.1)
Employ Oil Adjusted 13.7 (2.4) 13.4 (2.4) 12,9 (2.3)
Unemp Oil Adjusted 8.4 (2.4) 8.1 (2.4) 8.3 (2.3)
IV esdrnate of ~ (multiplied by 100) from
Corr(v,s)ij,z = a + ~Trade(w) ij,z + E ij,~.
Instrumental Variables for trade intensity are: 1) log of distanc~ 2) dummy variable for common border and 3)
dummy variable for common language.
Standard errors in parentheses. Intercepts not reported. Bilateral quarterly data from 21 industrialized muntries,
1959 through 1993 split into four sub-periods. Maximum sample size = 840.
































11.5 (1.5) -13.0 (2.9)
1
10.7 (1.6) -5.1 (2.9)
1
8.9 (1.9) -2.7 (3.6)
7.3 (1.7) 5.1 (3.2)
1
12.1 (2.5) -13.2 (4.8)
8.6 (1.6) .0 (3.0)
10.8 (1.7) -8.7 (3.1)
10.4 (1.9) -1.7 (3.6)
7.7 (1.8) 1.1 (3.4)
6.5 (1.5) 10,8 (2,8)
9.9 (1.6) -7.1 (2.9)
8.6 (1.8) .5 (3.4)
I
7.6 (1.8) 4.7 (3.3)
IV estimates of ~ and y (multiplied by 100) from
Corr(v,s)ij,z = a + ~Trade(w) ij,z + yFIX ij,z + Gij,~,
where FIXiJ,z is the (period-average of a) dummy variable which is unity if i and j had a mutually fixed exchange
rate during the period.
Instnunenta.1 Variables for trade intensity are: 1) log of distance; 2) dummy variable for common border and 3)
dummy variable for common language.
Stan&d errors in parentheses. Intercepts not reported.
Bilated quarterly data from 21 industrialized countries, 1959 through 1993 split into four sub-periods.
Maximum sample size = 840.
26Table 5: IV Estimates of ~ and 6 (Effect of Oil Price Shock)
(Total Trade Weights)
Price of Oil Change in Oil Price
Activity De-Trending P 6 P 6
GDP Differencing 10.3 (1.5) .4 (,5) 9.8 (1.4) 6.2 (1.1)
Ind Prod Differencing 10.1 (1.5) .8 (.5) 9.0 (1.4) 9.3 (1.1)
Employ Differencing 8.6 (1.8) -.8 (.6) 8.4 (1.8) 2.5 (1.4)
Unemp Differencing 7.9 (1.6) -2.5 (,6) 7.3 (1.6) 5.5 (1.2)
GDP Quadratic 11.2 (1.9) 2.5 (,7) 10.9 (1.9) 4.6 (1.5)
Ind Prod Quadratic 9.2(2.1) 6.5 (1.8) 8.6 (2.1) 6.2 (1.6)
Employ Quadratic 8.6 (2.5) -.6 (.8) 8.5 (2.5) .7 (1.9)
Unemp Quadratic 10.8 (2.4) .5 (.8) 10.3 (2.4) 6.2 (1.9)
GDP HP-filter 8.6 (1.5) .2 (.5) 8.2 (1.5) 4.6 (1.2)
Ind Prod HP-filter 9.7 (1.6) 4.3 (1,5) 8.7 (1.6) 9.2(1,2)
Employ HP-filter 10.1 (1.8) -1.0 (.6) 9.8 (1.8) 3.3 (1.4)
Unemp HP-filter 7,8 (1.7) -.5 (.6) 7.3 (1.7) 5.6 (1.3)
GDP HP-SA 7.3 (1.4) -.4 (.5) 6.9 (1,4) 4.6 (1.1)
Ind Prod HP-SA 9.0 (1.5) 4.2 (1.3) 8.2 (1.4) 7.3 (1.1)
Employ HP-SA 8.6 (1.7) -1.3 (.6) 8.4 (1.7) 1.9 (1.3)
Unemp HP-SA 8.1 (1.7) -.6 (.6) 7.6 (1.7) 5.1 (1.3)
lV estimates of ~ and y (multiplied by 100) from
tirr(v,s)i j,z = a + ~Trade(w) ij,z + 5(POlL*{[~uel-MFuel)~ i[(XFuel-MFuel)/Ylj })r + Gij,~,
where (POIL* {[(XFuel-MFuel)/Yl i[(XFuel-MFuel)~ })~ is the @riod-average ofi the product of the nominal
prim of oil (in $/bbl, deflated by tile global CPI), net he] exports normalized by nominal GDP in coun~ i, and the
latter variable for country j.
Instrumental Variables for trade intensity are : 1) log of dimce; 2) dummy variable for common border; and 3)
dummy variable for common language,
Standard errors in parentheses. Intercepts not reported,
Bilateral quarterly data from 21 industrialized countries, 1959 through 1993 split into four sub-periods.
Maximum sample sim = 840.
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